On the role of eviction in group living sex changers
Iwasa, Y. and Yamaguchi, S.In most sex-changing fishes in coral reefs, a dominant male and multiple females form a mating group (harem). In a few species, the subordinates are simultaneous hermaphrodites that may act as sneakers. In this paper, we ask whether the subordinates in most sex changers choose to be female or whether they are forced to give up their male function to avoid eviction by the harem holder. We consider a game model in which (1) the dominant male evicts some hermaphroditic subordinates if the risk of sperm competition in regard to fertilizing eggs is high, and (2) each subordinate individual chooses its own sex allocation considering the risk of being evicted. In the evolutionarily stable state, the dominant male evicts subordinates only when the subordinates vary greatly in their reproductive resources. All the subordinate individuals are female if the summed male function of the subordinates is smaller than that of the dominant male. Otherwise, all the subordinates are hermaphrodites, and the large individuals have the same male investment but a greatly different female investment, while small individuals have a reduced male investment to avoid eviction risk. We conclude that situations in which the sex allocation of subordinates is affected by the possibility of eviction by the harem holder are rather limited
Key Words: Game theory, Hermaphrodite, Reproductive success, Sex allocation, Subordinate